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“State Your Defense!”
Children Negotiate Analytic Frames in the Context of Deliberative Dialogue
Jennifer Hauver (Randolph-Macon College)
Abstract
The purpose of this exploratory study was to identify the analytic frames children (ages 9 to 11) 
employed as they worked together to make sense of an ill- structured problem, what those same chil-
dren did when their frames collided in the context of deliberative dialogue, and what they learned 
from the process of negotiation. Data included pre- and post- dialogue interviews with individual 
children as well as videotapes of the five dialogue sessions. Analysis suggests that children invoked six 
frames: fairness, common good, safety, kindness, tradition and self- interest. Of these, fairness and com-
mon good were super- ordinate frames, which resonated with peers and facilitated the building of con-
sensus. Groups in which children demonstrated greater willingness to engage others’ ideas made the 
most gains in their ability to employ multiple frames from pre- to post- task interviews. Findings sug-
gest a need for explicit instruction about the sociocultural contexts delimiting individuals’ framing of 
complex problems. Such instruction has the potential to grow students’ civic capabilities as critical 
consumers of public discourse who can listen across difference and participate productively in shared 
decision making.
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Four fourth graders are gathered around a table. They are tasked with making a collective decision about how to spend a sum of money allotted for 
playground improvements. The PTA has given them five choices. 
They can purchase a sunshade, a swing set, playground balls for all 
classes, or Hula- Hoops and jump ropes for all classes, or they can 
give the money to the pre- K children to spend on their playground. 
Oliver, Cody, and Adam each announce their preference: sunshade, 
pre- K, sunshade, respectively. Addie offers hers: “We should give 
the money to pre- K because they don’t have as much stuff as we do. 
So that’s my first choice.” Something about her use of the word 
should gives the group pause. Cody then states, “Say ‘aye’ if you 
want the pre- K playground.” Oliver and Adam look at one another, 
clearly taken by surprise. “What?” Adam says, “I wanted sunshade.” 
“Me too,” says Oliver. To which Cody responds, “Well, then, state 
your defense.”
 “What defense?” asks Adam.
“Your defense to keep your honor,” responds Cody.
“What?!”
Jennifer Hauver is an associate professor in the Education 
Department at Randolph-Macon College. Her interests center on 
democratic and civic education. She is editor of Social Studies 
Education Review, lead author of Religion in the Classroom: 
Dilemmas for Democratic Education (Routledge), and coeditor 
of Feminist Community Engagement: Achieving Praxis (Palgrave).
democracy & education, vol 25, no- 2  feature article 2
“I can go first,” offers Oliver.
“Okay, state your defense,” directs Cody again.
“Well, I’m thinking we can get the sunshade for the big 
playground because we all like running around mostly, and we get 
hot . . . and the pre- K- ers mostly play ball, like they throw the balls 
and they ride their bikes.”
Addie adds, “They have tricycles.”
“Yeah, they ride the bike, the little tricycle bike, and we run 
around. And we like running around, and we get hotter, but they 
just like riding bikes,” Oliver continues.
“I know. I didn’t think about that. And they have chalk and they 
have the blacktop,” Addie adds again.
What makes ill- structured problems ill- structured is that they 
not only lack a clear “best” solution but they lack a definitive “best” 
way of framing the problem so that one might determine a best 
solution (Kuhn, 2015). In this brief excerpt, the three boys begin  
the dialogue by stating their personal preferences. Addie shifts the 
conversation by framing the problem normatively: in terms of 
what the group should do according to some abstract sense of right 
and wrong. This new framing comes with some power. Immedi-
ately one of the boys calls for a vote in favor of Addie’s proposed 
solution and, when he is challenged, demands that the challenger 
“state his defense.” In defending his side, Oliver seems to feel that 
not only must he justify his preference for the sunshade but he must 
simultaneously refute Addie’s assertion that spending money on 
themselves would not be the right thing to do. He explains that the 
pre- K children mostly play ball and ride bikes— toys they already 
have— and that the older children have greater need for new 
equipment. He seemingly accepts Addie’s concern for fairness as a 
legitimate one but rejects it as an acceptable frame for this particu-
lar problem. In lieu of a fairness frame, he speaks on behalf of all 
other big kids, asserting that it is in their common interest to 
purchase a sunshade.
Most research on children’s argumentation has focused on 
interventions that may grow the sophistication of their arguments 
(often in writing). In particular, interventions are typically aimed 
at increasing children’s use of evidence to support claims and their 
ability to engage both sides of a debate. Such studies suggest that 
young children are less likely to offer dual or integrative arguments 
or to understand the significance of evidence for argument 
development (Brem & Rips, 2000; Kuhn, 2001; Kuhn & Crowell, 
2011; Kuhn & Udell, 2003). Pontecorvo and Giradet (1993) went so 
far as to report that nine- year- olds offer one- sided (personal) 
arguments over 80% of the time. This may be because, develop-
mentally, it has been argued, children are just growing their 
perspective- taking ability about this time (Flavell, 2004). While 
such work is helpful in shedding light on children’s ability to 
construct and articulate a sound argument, it rarely unpacks 
children’s reasoning about ill- structured problems along the way. 
And, as Kuhn and Udell (2003) asserted, much less attention has 
been paid to the process of children’s argumentative discourse than 
to the constructions of their individual arguments.
An exception to this trend is work by Zhang and colleagues 
(2013), which suggested that even young children apply a variety of 
analytic frames as they make sense of complex problems and that 
these frames can be understood as culturally relevant. In their 
study of Chinese and American children’s reasoning about a moral 
dilemma in the book The Pinewood Derby (McNurlen, 1998), these 
scholars found that Chinese students were more likely to demon-
strate altruistic tendencies in their framing of the problem, calling 
on principles of honesty, empathy, and friendship (common values 
in collectivist cultures) while American children were more likely 
to express egocentric concerns such as personal consequences for 
doing the “right” thing. After participating in a series of dialogue 
sessions, however, all children demonstrated increased willingness 
to consider new ways of framing the problem (suggesting that 
development is not the only factor in explaining children’s growing 
perspective taking ability).
Much more research is needed, however, that strives  
to understand the nature of children’s arguments as they represent 
understandings they have about the world. How do children frame 
the problem? What general principles or perspectives contribute to 
that framing? What happens when children’s frames collide in 
dialogue? Furthermore, much remains to be discovered about 
children’s process as they collectively negotiate among analytic 
frames for a given problem, and how their experience may 
facilitate differing learning outcomes. Such insights would provide 
a foundation from which to make informed pedagogical and 
policy decisions with regards to elementary civic education. In this 
article, I describe the analytic frames children (ages 9– 11) 
employed to make sense of the ill- structured problem described 
above, as well as what those same children did when their frames 
collided in the context of deliberative dialogue, and what they 
learned from the process of negotiation.
Deliberative Dialogue
Unlike other forms of discussion, deliberation has as its aim 
“deciding on a plan of action that will resolve a shared problem . . . 
The opening question is usually some version of, ‘What should we 
do about this?” (Parker, 2003, p. 131). “Generally speaking, delib-
eration processes engage people in discussion with others about 
public issues that are controversial but require collective decision 
making and action” (Carretero, Haste, & Bermudez, 2016, p. 302). 
Though deliberation leads, at best, to a provisional resolution, it 
nonetheless requires consensus among members of a group on 
what to do now given what we know.
Deliberative discussion is grounded in a participatory 
conception of democracy and a belief that effective citizens 
demonstrate “a variety of social capacities for working with 
others . . . to influence public and civic life by building coalitions, 
seeking consensus, negotiating differences, and managing conflict” 
(Carretero, Haste, & Bermudez, 2016, p. 297). As Gutmann and 
Thompson (2004) argued, deliberative democracy is a form of 
government
. . . in which free and equal citizens (and their representatives) justify 
decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that are 
mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching 
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conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to 
challenge in the future. (p. 7)
Ideally, deliberative dialogue is characterized by mutuality 
and approached with humility and caution. It requires that one 
grant others epistemic privilege and acknowledge the ever- present 
possibility that one may be wrong (Parker, 2003). “Talk thus breaks 
through the walls of the private world of family, friends and 
neighbors and ordains concourse with strangers in a larger 
artificial world of political citizenship” (Barber, 2003, p. 189). 
Humility means acknowledging that one’s “knowledge and 
experience are limited and incomplete” (Barber, 2003, p. 12). This 
acknowledgment requires that one enter and navigate interactions 
with caution. Parker (2003) wrote, “If I am cautious when listening 
and responding, I will engage carefully so that I am not denying or 
dismissing the validity of the insider’s point of view, nor even 
appearing to do so” (p. 93). The democratic concept of mutuality 
recognizes the inevitability of one’s self being part of an authentic 
civic relationship. Humility and caution are necessary only because 
we cannot ever truly escape the private spaces we inhabit and the 
ways they shape our knowing. Competent participation in a civic 
space, then, involves
listening as well as talking, striving to understand points of view 
different from one’s own, challenging ideas and proposals rather than 
persons, admitting ignorance, slowing the rush to decision so as to 
clarify or reframe the problem or gather more information . . . even 
appreciating the principle attributed to Voltaire: “I disapprove of what 
you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” (Parker, 
2003, pp. 87– 88)
Barber (2003) asserted:
“I will listen” means . . . I will put myself in his place, I will try to 
understand, I will strain to hear what makes us alike, I will listen for a 
common rhetoric evocative of a common purpose or a common good. 
(p. 175)
Phillips (2004), in discussion with “a fellowship of six 
students,” three Jewish and three Arab, found a powerful example 
of such listening. Iyad, an Arab student, says of his evolving 
friendship with his Jewish colleagues:
We did start to speak, but carefully, still saying what we felt we had to 
say, but also being sensitive to the other’s feelings. And we listened 
carefully to each other’s responses. We realized we had similar 
concerns and hopes— to live free of fear, to have security for our 
families, to have some control over our lives, our futures.
Dorothy, a Jewish member of the group, agreed:
Instead of trying to win an argument, we voiced our concerns, but also 
we really opened ourselves up to the concerns of the other. . . . Because 
once you recognize how legitimate each other’s concerns are, then I 
think you have to go the next step and address them. (pp. 165– 166)
As seen here, a disposition toward active and authentic communi-
cation enables the sort of mutuality necessary for the “creative 
resolution of conflict” (Hunt & Metcalf, 1955/1996). Mutuality in 
civic dialogue, then, involves negotiation through collaborative, 
empathic processes (Selman, 1980), integration of the needs of self 
and other (Gilligan, 1982), and authenticity (Siddle Walker & 
Snarey, 2004). It is not just talking and listening, per se, that 
matter— rather, talking and listening with humility, in an effort to 
understand the other, sensitive to her feelings, and in search of 
common ground. Such skills are particularly important within the 
context of civic deliberation, where it is not enough to simply 
“agree to disagree.”
To this end, it would seem, “schools ought to teach students to 
share their reasoning with each other, to listen to competing points 
of view, to consider new evidence, and to treat each other as 
political equals” (McAvoy & Hess, 2013, p. 19). Effective teachers, 
however, are hamstrung if they know little about how their 
students learn, what emerging competencies look like, and what 
instructional methods facilitate growth. Thus, it was not my 
intention to evaluate the degree to which children’s engagement 
matched this deliberative ideal; rather, I sought to understand 
children’s thought and action within the deliberative context 
established.
Sociocultural Theories of Communication
Communication is the process of producing and negotiating 
meanings and is always culturally situated (Schirato & Yell, 2000). 
The deliberative dialogue sessions described here, for instance, 
were particular contexts in which children with unique back-
grounds talked together. But their encounters were nested within 
larger contexts. And children’s understandings of those larger 
contexts shaped how they approached and engaged in the dialogue 
(James, Kobe, & Zhao, 2017). Children had prior knowledge of the 
school, for example, as a social milieu— of normative behavioral 
expectations, of what counted as knowledge, of their positions rela-
tive to others in this space. They had experience of the classroom, in 
so far as it had been a space where they came to know their peers. 
Intersecting with these fairly immediate contexts were the milieus 
where children spent time outside of school— families and 
communities. In each of these spaces, children consistently 
received messages about what was valued, expected, understood to 
be right or good or true— messages that informed the solutions  
to the problem they generated.
Whether consciously or subconsciously, children (like 
adults) are always in the process of reading the spaces they 
encounter. Such reading involves asking What is expected here? 
What is appropriate? How will I be perceived or positioned by 
others? and is necessarily shaped by our cultural and sociocultural 
understandings. Examples of cultural understandings include 
shared conceptions of masculinity and femininity (Hofstede, 
1991), understandings about a “good life” or moral good (Kluck-
hohn & Strodtbeck, 1961), and general norms and practices of a 
culture that codify acceptable behavior. Cultural understandings 
are, of course, experienced and understood by individuals and 
groups differently; they are not monolithic. Nonetheless, these 
understandings represent generally accepted (and typically 
dominant) ways of being and thinking. Sociocultural understand-
ings emerge from the groups of which we are a part. Some of these 
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groups we choose (service groups, occupational groups, political 
parties). Others, we are born into (racial and ethnic groups, 
families, age groups, gender groups). These groups “enforce sets 
of expected behaviors (norms and rules) and have shared values” 
that influence our communication with others (Gudykunst & 
Kim, 2003, p. 47). The process of reading and rereading spaces 
allows us to acquire a “practical sense,” or the ability to make our 
utterances relevant or appropriate in the spaces where we spend 
time (Bourdieu, 1991).
The utterances we make, then, are the result of the relation 
between our linguistic habitus (our reading of the space) and the 
specific linguistic field, or market,1 in which we find ourselves 
(Bourdieu, 1991). Each context is a market, in that resources 
(different kinds of capital) are distributed and exchanged. One’s 
accent, for example, or command of local dialect, and social status 
are all forms of capital that contribute to an individual’s relative 
power in a linguistic market. Because markets are not all the same, 
our power, our status relative to others, our ability to effect change, 
also vary from context to context. A speaker’s sense or expectation 
of the value that linguistic practices will have in different markets is 
thus also part of his or her linguistic habitus.
As applied here, sociocultural theories of communication 
allow us to see children’s analytic frames as reflective of their own 
cultural positions. The negotiation of children’s analytic frames is 
also a culturally situated process of meaning making where some 
frames likely have more capital than others. Borrowing from the 
field of political science (and, admittedly, research conducted  
with adults), I use the term resonant to describe those analytic 
frames that carry greater power in a particular dialogic space 
(Desrosiers, 2007; Martin, 2015; Rojecki, 2007; Woodly,  
2007). Desrosiers (2007) explained:
When filtered through common identity referents, the language, the 
images and ideas [called] upon are so close to what individuals know, 
so consistent with their social reality that they can seem 
commonsensical, justifiable and fitting. These collective referents are 
reinterpreted, not invented– but by being historically or normatively 
grounded in a common cultural stock, when used to build appeals, 
they can help achieve greater resonance and in parallel crystallise 
sentiments of group attachment to foster solidarity and justify 
collective action. (p. 2)
Put simply, ideas have resonance when they strike participants as 
being more intelligible or persuasive than others. Savvy partici-
pants may even tap into highly resonant ideas, or what Poggi 
(2005) called “super- ordinate goals,” in order to gain traction for 
their own particular subordinate goals. It is safe to say that young 
children will relate to dialogue and reason about ill- structured 
problems differently than adults do. Understanding these differ-
ences was the subject of this inquiry. Specifically, research ques-
tions included:
 1. What analytic frames do children deploy in this delibera-
tive dialogue session?
 2. How do children negotiate differing analytic frames in 
the context of deliberative dialogue?
 3. Which analytic frameworks have the most resonance? 
Why?
 4. How does participation in the deliberative dialogue 
contribute to changes in how individual children frame 
the problem from pre- to post- interview?
Methods
Findings reported here are part of a larger two- year design- based 
research study2 in which a team of researchers sought to under-
stand relationships between young children’s  thought and action 
across four civic spaces: deliberative dialogue sessions, bystander 
dilemmas, collaborative inquiry, and group discussion. Here, I focus 
explicitly on children’s participation in deliberative dialogue 
sessions. The design of these tasks provided rich opportunities to 
access children’s thought and action at both an individual and a 
group level.
Community, School, and Classroom
Cobb Elementary School is located in the Southeast United States. 
The student body at Cobb Elementary is made up of approximately 
500 children, 39% of whom are African American, 7% Asian, 5% 
Hispanic, 46% White, and 3% multiracial (self- identified). Students 
hail from 30 states and 23 countries. Cobb is seated in a city with 
one of the highest poverty rates in the nation (nearly 40%). 
Sixty- five percent of students receive free or reduced lunch.
The focus classroom consisted of 20 fourth graders, ages 9– 11. 
This age group was selected because we understand the period 
between ages 7 and 10 to be critical for growth in communication 
skills (McDevitt, Spivey, Sheehan, Lennon, & Story, 1990). Chil-
dren in this age span are said to grow increasingly capable of 
monitoring their speech from another’s perspective and consider 
the perspectives of others (Flavell, 2004) and to be experiencing a 
reduction in egocentrism and a greater ability to acknowledge and 
understand the motives and intentions of others (Piaget, 1950; 
Wadsworth, 2003). Because research suggests that this process 
begins earlier for girls, due to their tendency for attachment 
(Gilligan, 1982), and among African American students (roughly 
40% of the students with whom we worked) (Siddle Walker & 
Snarey, 2004), we hoped that students in this class would demon-
strate a range of civic performances and understandings. Detailed 
demographic data about the children whose families consented for 
them to participate is included in Table 1 below.
Table 1. Student Participant Demographics
Pseudonym Race Socioeconomic Status Gender
Anna Multiracial Economically 
disadvantaged
Female
Adam White Noneconomically 
disadvantaged
Male
Addie African American Economically 
disadvantaged
Female
Brittany African American Not reported Female
(continued)
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Table 1. Student Participant Demographics (continued)
Pseudonym Race Socioeconomic Status Gender
Caleb White Noneconomically 
disadvantaged
Male
Cody White Noneconomically 
disadvantaged
Male
Curtis African American Economically 
disadvantaged
Male
Daniel African American Economically 
disadvantaged
Male
Dominic African American Not reported Male
David White Economically 
disadvantaged
Male
Eddie African American Economically 
disadvantaged
Male
Helen Asian American Noneconomically 
disadvantaged
Female
Joshua White Noneconomically 
disadvantaged
Male
Jacob African American Noneconomically 
disadvantaged
Male
Mary White Economically 
disadvantaged
Female
Maggie White Noneconomically 
disadvantaged
Female
Oliver African American Economically 
disadvantaged
Male
Paula White/Hispanic Noneconomically 
disadvantaged
Female
Rachel White Noneconomically 
disadvantaged
Female
Taylor African American Economically 
disadvantaged
Female
Deliberative Dialogue Session: Playground Equipment
Deliberative dialogue, defined here as the process of collaboratively 
arriving at a decision about a problem by comparing, contrasting, 
and evaluating alternatives (Asterhan & Babichenko, 2015), has been 
shown to incite more effective participation than those in which 
students are expected to persuade others or simply engage in open 
discussion (Garcia- Mila, Gilabert, Erduran & Felton, 2013; Schwarz, 
1995). Deliberative dialogue sessions are particularly generative 
when they engage students in shared reasoning about an ill- 
structured problem— one that challenges students to apply various 
analytic frames in an effort to weigh better and worse solutions, but 
is open ended in that different frameworks may yield different “best” 
answers (Adey & Shayer, 1990; Asterhan & Schwarz, 2009; Kuhn, 
2015). Drawing on the literature, we crafted a task that was authentic 
and ill- structured and required students to strive for consensus.
The topic for this deliberative dialogue session was grounded 
in real conversations members of the Cobb Elementary School 
community were having. Their new school still required a number 
of finishing touches, including outside areas for playing and 
gathering. Children often discussed their desire for more play-
ground equipment and shady areas to escape the intensity of the 
sun. Adults, including family members, teachers, administrators 
and other school personnel, frequently participated in similar 
conversations. As this task was being presented to the children, 
members of the Parent- Teacher Association (PTA) were engaged 
in discussions about what equipment to purchase next. We 
explained to the children that the results of their peer deliberations 
would be shared with the PTA. We introduced the task to the 
students by explaining the situation to them. The task read as 
follows:
Your grade level has been given some money to buy more 
playground equipment.
You have five options:
• You could buy a sunshade for your playground.
• You could buy a swing set for your playground.
• You could buy a set of playground balls for your class to 
use.
• You could buy a set of jump ropes and Hula- Hoops for 
your class to use.
• You could give the money to the preK students so they 
can buy playground equipment.
Think about all of the choices. Decide which choice is best. How 
would you spend the money?
Figure 1. Playground task.
The task was bounded by the five choices, which members of 
the PTA were indeed considering. This enabled us to see how 
individuals and groups of children reasoned about and selected 
among those choices. The closed nature of the task also enabled us 
to see whether or not the children thought beyond the task’s 
parameters. The task also challenged the students to think about 
whose interests were being served by the different options pre-
sented and to decide which considerations were most important to 
make.
Data Collection
Data collection included individual pre- and post- task interviews 
with each child and videotapes of groups of children as they 
deliberated. During the pre- task interview, the researcher read the 
task to the child and offered an image of each playground improve-
ment option in order to make the task less abstract. The child was 
given some time to think about the problem. After the child 
decided which choice s/he felt was best, the researcher asked the 
child a series of questions to learn more about his/her decision as 
well as how the child was thinking about the discussion s/he was 
about to have. Each child was asked to discuss how s/he conceptu-
alized the problem and to predict how his/her group discussion 
would unfold. (See Appendix A: Pre- Task Interview Protocol.)
After each of the individual pre- task interviews was com-
pleted, group members were brought together and read the task. 
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The researchers provided the children with images of the five 
choices and a group recording sheet. They were given approxi-
mately 20 minutes to discuss the issue and decide how the money 
should be spent. The group discussion sessions were video- 
recorded from two different angles. This allowed us to see how the 
children were engaging with one another, performing in both 
verbal and nonverbal ways, and enacting (or changing) their 
self- described stances. We used tabletop microphones in order to 
improve the quality of the audio.
After the discussion session concluded, each of the 
children was again interviewed by a researcher. The post- task 
interview was designed to elicit the students’ interpretation of 
their group’s discussion and decision. They were asked to 
evaluate the nature and quality of their discussion by describing 
how the conversation went and how they felt about the outcome 
of their conversation. Both the pre- and post- task interviews 
were videotaped (audio- taped on rare occasions when we ran 
into technical difficulties). (See Appendix B: Post- Task Inter-
view Protocol.)
Data Analysis
Establishing codes. Zhang and colleagues (2013) identified nine 
moral principles from which children drew in their reflective 
essays: honesty, fairness, empathy, friendship, promise, trust, 
golden rule, common good, don’t tattle. These they identified a 
priori (through careful reading of the text to which children would 
respond) and checked against an initial reading of children’s essays. 
A robust example of research on young children’s analytic frames 
(and one of the only examples), this work offered a useful place to 
begin. I followed much the same process in generating codes for 
analytic frames. Because I was present when data was collected, I 
had an idea of the frames children had employed individually and 
in dialogue. I generated a list of frames based on my understanding 
of the ill- structured problem and my experience while watching 
children participate in the task. I generated five codes: fairness, 
kindness, safety, common good, and self- interest. After careful 
reading of the pre- task and post- task interviews and video 
transcripts, I added a sixth code: tradition.
I then invited four research assistants to read one complete 
data set (pre- and post- task interviews and video transcript for one 
group), openly coding for analytic frames. We met as a group to 
discuss their codes, and despite the assistants’ having given the 
codes slightly different names (being nice for kindness and personal 
gain for self- interest), their collective list was the same as my own. 
From here, I went on to code each pre- task and post- task interview 
as well as video transcript. I sought first to describe how often each 
of the six analytic frames was invoked within each group’s dialogue. 
Based on my reading of Zhang et al.’s (2013) work, I hypothesized 
that fairness may be a prominent frame.
Identifying opportunities for negotiation. Because I was 
interested in understanding what happens when children’s 
differing analytic frames collide in dialogue, I then revisited the 
videotape transcripts to identify “opportunities for negotiation.” 
These I defined as occurrences when analytic frames were offered 
by children. I wished to understand what happened when a frame 
was offered. Did other children agree with the speaker’s framing? 
Reject it? Ignore it? In this second layer of analysis, I coded each 
conversational turn following the identified “opportunity  
for negotiation” with the following: A (asserted), I (ignored),  
C (contested) or E (echoed). Coding stopped when the negotiation 
of a particular frame ended.
The following is an example of a group’s negotiation of an 
analytic frame (safety):
Addie: You know how they told us not to be sliding down 
those other poles? People might slide down these poles 
[of the sunshade] and they might fall. (Safety- A)
Oliver: But they won’t be able to get on them. (Safety- C)
Adam: Yeah, they’re vertical with a top. They’re straight up 
and down. (Safety- C)
Cody: Curiosity is, someone might run into the poles. 
(Safety- E)
Addie: Yeah, people can run into the poles when they’re 
running . . . (Safety- E)
Oliver: They might run into y’all’s poles. But people, well 
people are supposed to look in front and look to see 
where they’re going . . . I haven’t seen anybody hit a pole 
on their face or anything before. (Safety- C)
Cody: It would be nice to have a tree house, wouldn’t it?
In this example, Addie and Cody offered up safety concerns as 
a way of framing the problem to determine a best solution. Oliver 
and Adam contested this framing, first by saying that children can’t 
climb the poles and then explaining that it’s unlikely anyone would 
run into the poles. Seemingly convinced, Cody shifted the conver-
sation to talk about his wish for a tree house and safety was not 
brought up again.
Contrarily, the following is an example of an analytic frame 
being echoed once it is introduced. After her group had collectively 
dismissed both safety and fairness as acceptable ways to frame the 
problem, Helen asked, “Well then why do you think it’s good to 
have a sunshade?”
Taylor: Because when it’s really hot outside, we can sit in the 
shade. (Common good- A)
Dominic: Yeah, or when some kids are playing, they can be in 
the shade. (Common good- E)
Joshua: Yeah, some people like to walk around where they 
won’t be bothered by the hot sun. Plus the sun isn’t 
shining in your eyes. (Common good- E)
Joshua: It’s also a built- in umbrella, so everyone can go 
outside while it’s raining. (Common good- E)
In this example, the group found a way of framing  
the problem on which they can all agree. In response to Helen’s 
prompting, the other three children suggested that the sunshade 
was good for “we,” “some kids,” “some people,” and “everyone.” 
They argued that the sunshade was the best solution because so 
many people would benefit from it— those who wanted to sit, play, 
or walk in the shade, those who didn’t like sun in their eyes, or 
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disliked feeling hot, even those who wanted to play outside when 
it’s raining. Once this framing was offered, it gained momentum, 
resonating with other members of the group. They felt comfortable 
making their decision because they agreed that it would do the 
most good for the most people.
Upon completing this second layer of analysis, I wrote thick 
narrative descriptions for each group’s performance in dialogue 
that sought to answer the questions: Which frames are in play? 
Which ones seem to resonate? How do children weigh the relative 
power of differing frames? Some frames were easily and often 
contested, such as those appealing to self- interest. Others seemed 
to present children with a challenge. They felt they needed to 
resolve the issue a frame posed or to choose the particular 
solution the frame was used to justify. As predicted, fairness was 
one of these more challenging frames with which children felt 
compelled to wrestle. Common good was another. The latter 
examples I identified as super- ordinate (Poggi, 2005) analytic 
frames— ones that resonated the most with the greatest number 
of children.
Documenting shifts in thinking. The final step of the analysis 
involved revisiting the interview transcripts to see what changes, if 
any, were evident in children’s framing of the problem from pre- to 
post- task. I was specifically interested in seeing what frames 
students employed in their post- task interview that they hadn’t 
before, and how they might explain any shifts in their thinking. I 
began by recording all of the frames offered by children in their 
pre- task interviews as potential ways of thinking about the 
problem (ones that they or others might offer). I then did the same 
with the post- task interviews, noting any new frames that children 
offered. Finally, I recorded which children brought which frames 




Across the three data sources (pre- task interviews, video- taped 
dialogue sessions, post- task interviews), children employed six 
analytic frames: fairness, kindness, safety, common good, self- 
interest, and tradition. I describe each below.
Fairness. Especially when children argued in favor of giving 
the money to the pre- k kids, children framed the problem as a 
question of fairness. For the most part, fairness was understood as 
a matter of equality. Maggie said, “They don’t have a lot of stuff like 
we do.” Helen said, “Yeah, they have nothing to do.” Often, these 
arguments included comparisons made through numbers. “We 
have two rocks, a spider web and a climbing thing. They have only 
one thing to climb on.” Counter arguments that also invoked 
fairness as a frame included “They have bikes and bouncy balls” 
and “They have more equipment than we do. We have only 
structures.”
Common good. An oft- invoked frame was that of common 
good. Typically, children’s framing of the problem as an issue of 
common good meant that they thought one solution to be better 
than another because more people would like it or benefit from it. 
Sometimes these arguments were fairly utilitarian: “There are only 
about 30 pre- K- ers, and there are at least 160 kids in fourth and 
fifth grade, so we should keep the money.” More often, common 
good arguments highlighted the ways different groups of children 
would benefit from the decision. Dominic said, “We all get hot. I 
think other kids will like it.” Taylor added, “Some people like to sit 
in the shade, some like to run around. This way we have choices.” 
Conner said, “I’ve heard a lot of people say they want a swing set.”
Safety. Many children framed the problem as one of safety, 
saying such things as “The poles might be dangerous . . . People 
could run into them”; “People could get hit by the balls. It’s not 
safe”; “Someone might get hit in the head”; and “If it’s too sunny, we 
can’t see, and we might run into people and get hurt.”
Kindness. Children who framed the problem as an issue of 
kindness offered such arguments as “I think we should be gener-
ous,” “It would be nice for them,” “They might even write a song for 
us to thank us,” and “They’d be so happy!” Contrarily, counter 
arguments were offered such as “If we don’t give it to them, they’d 
be sad.”
Self- interest. At some point in each conversation, at least one 
child talked about his or her personal preference, framing the 
problem as one of self- interest. Mary said, “They’re fun to play 
with. I like this one.” David offered, “I’d rather be hot than cold, so I 
pick sunshade.” Later he said, “I pick me. And I’m sunshade.” 
Sometimes children couched their arguments in shared self- 
interest. David said, “We should have greatness before we leave 
elementary school.” Cody said, “The sunshade will take too long to 
build. By the time it’s up, we’ll be in middle school.”
Tradition. Occasionally, children framed the problem as one 
of tradition. They suggested that because they used to have one of 
the playground options (usually the swing set), they should again. 
Curtis said, “We had that at our old school. So we should have one 
here.”
Though the frames are described here as distinct, they often 
overlapped in interesting and complex ways. Self- interest was 
sometimes oriented toward “we,” suggesting that the speaker 
hoped to tap into others’ personal interest and find some common 
ground. If other children didn’t share the speaker’s interest, 
however, the contribution was dismissed as selfish or irrelevant. 
Safety too had an element of common good— students who offered 
safety as a frame seemed to be suggesting that it was in everyone’s 
best interest to choose one thing or another because everyone 
would be safer. Interestingly, children almost always determined 
that safety was not a reasonable framing of the problem because 
the safety concerns raised were not likely to be experienced by the 
majority of children. As I explain in the next section, common 
good and fairness played particularly powerful roles in dialogue. 
The ability of individual children to connect safety, kindness, 
tradition or their own self- interest to concerns about fairness  
or common good mattered. For this reason, I consider fairness and 
common good to be what Poggi (2005) called “super- ordinate” 
frames, and the others, “subordinate.”
Negotiating Analytic Frames
Table 2 represents the number of times a particular frame was 
engaged in some way during children’s deliberation. The first 
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column includes the total number of conversational turns in which 
children attended to the frame overall. This includes the number of 
times the frame was asserted, echoed, and contested. From this 
chart, it is clear that fairness and common good were the most often 
engaged frames. Fairness occupied 72 conversational turns. 
Though it was only asserted eight times, children contested it 53 
times. Common good occupied 51 conversational turns. It was 
asserted 36 times and contested thrice. That these two frames were 
so prevalent in conversation yet treated so differently by children is 
significant, and I return to it in the next section.





Asserted Ignored Agreed Contested
Fairness 72 8 0 11 53
Common 
Good
51 36 (3) 12 3
Safety 26 12 (4) 5 9
Kindness 21 10 (6) 0 11
Self- Interest 9 8 (7) 0 1
Tradition 1 1 (1) 0 0
Self- interest and tradition were the least often engaged frames. 
They were neither asserted very often, nor were they taken up by 
peers. It could be that children didn’t believe these frames would 
resonate with their peers, and so they didn’t offer them very often. 
It might also be that children learned this along the way. When 
these frames were offered during dialogue, they were almost always 
ignored by the other children. Failing to have others pick up on 
their offering, children dropped these frames.
Kindness and safety, though asserted fairly frequently, were 
just as often contested. This suggests that children found these 
frames worthy of some consideration, but not the best frames for 
the problem at hand. Often, children’s kindness assertions were 
ignored. If they were taken up, they were met with explanations 
about how the young children’s feelings wouldn’t actually be hurt 
because the fourth graders are nice to them in other ways and they 
have other things to make them happy. Safety concerns were 
typically dismissed as unlikely, and so dropped. Taken together, we 
could say that these frames had some resonance— children seem to 
believe that being kind and safe are important considerations— but 
that in deciding this particular issue, kindness and safety were not 
the most pressing concerns.
In what follows, I offer a description of how deliberations 
unfolded within the five groups and the critical role fairness and 
common good played in each.
Fairness as a Super- Ordinate Frame
Findings suggest that children called on a number of analytic 
frames to make sense of the problem before them. When  
those frames collided in deliberative dialogue, some frames gained 
traction, resonating across the group, while others faded to the 
background. Among the analytic frames offered by children, 
fairness was a super- ordinate analytic frame— one that had 
resonating power with all children.
Once deliberation was under way, each group first wrestled 
with whether or not it was right to keep the money or give the 
money to the pre- K children to spend. Fairness was the analytic 
frame invoked most often during these initial parts of the delibera-
tion. Four of the five groups resolved this issue of fairness, and 
three did so rather quickly. In Group One, despite having been the 
one to assert that giving the money to the pre- K children would  
be the fair thing to do, Addie was quick to abandon her position 
once Oliver asserted that the pre- K children had more equipment 
than the older kids. She said, “I didn’t think about that. And they 
have chalk and they have a black top.” Adam echoed this, saying, 
“They have like balls and stuff.” Back and forth the group went, 
naming all of the specific equipment and activities the pre- K 
children already enjoyed. Once they agreed that fairness was not an 
issue, meaning they could keep the money for themselves, they 
shifted gears to consider other possible solutions.
In Group Two, Dominic started by saying that the pre- K 
children didn’t have much stuff to play with, and Helen agreed. 
Joshua confidently responded, “They have a lot of running space. 
I’ll tell you that right now.” Helen inserted, “I don’t think you guys 
like that idea.” And Joshua said, “Nope.” Fairness did not come up 
again.
Group Five also quickly put the pre- K question aside. Paula 
offered, “They have a lot of stuff already,” and the rest of the group 
agreed. They didn’t return to pre- K as a viable solution to the 
problem nor to fairness as a frame.
In Group Three, the issue of fairness was not so quickly put 
to rest. It came up in the first minute of the conversation when 
Jacob said, “Pre- K doesn’t have anything to play with.” The 
dialogue continued and children considered other possible 
solutions. Throughout the course of the dialogue, Conner 
interrupted by reminding his peers that they weren’t being 
particularly fair or kind. He said, “So we eliminated pre- K 
because you guys are heartless people who don’t care about little 
kids.” Later he said, “I thought you were good- hearted people, but 
apparently I was wrong.” Each time Conner offered these 
critiques, the group banded together to refute his accusations 
that they are unfair or unkind. They repeatedly told him that 
“they have lots of stuff,” that “there aren’t as many kids in pre- K,” 
and “they’ll get to use the sunshade when they’re older.” Eventu-
ally, Conner seemed satisfied and the group moved on to con-
sider other solutions.
Group Four also wrestled with the question of fairness. Unlike 
the other groups, however, they were unable to resolve it. The 
dialogue began with three of four children in favor of the sunshade. 
The most vocal sunshade proponent consistently argued for his 
own self- interest throughout the course of the deliberation. 
Contrarily, the original proponent of giving the money to the pre- k 
children consistently framed the problem as one of fairness. 
Eventually, the balance switched and three of four children opted 
for giving the money to pre- K, each offering a variety of kindness 
and fairness arguments. The one remaining proponent for 
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sunshade was unable to persuade his peers. His self- interest frame 
did not resonate like the fairness one did. In the end, the group 
failed to reach consensus.
Common Good . . . or Nothing
What happened once the fairness question was put to rest within a 
group? Then children were left to look for another super- ordinate 
analytic frame that would pull them together and help them sort 
among the choices. In three groups, once fairness was addressed, 
common good rose to the top as a super- ordinate analytic frame. In 
Group Two, for instance, children worked together to build a 
common good case, identifying more and more populations 
within the school who would benefit from the sunshade. In the 
third group, children justified their choice of the sunshade by 
saying that more children would benefit today from their choice 
and eventually the pre- K children would get to partake as well. And 
in Group Five, the group quickly decided on the sunshade by 
articulating how all children get hot and would enjoy the shade.
Group Four, because they could not resolve the fairness 
problem, never got to the point of looking for a second super- 
ordinate frame. Fairness trumped the dialogue and they worked 
right up to the end of their time trying to address it.
In the first group, the children did resolve the fairness 
question, but then struggled to find another super- ordinate frame 
that resonated with all members. Individual children offered lots of 
frames— safety, common good, self- interest— but none resonated 
across the group. Each was quickly refuted. Left without one, they 
resorted to standing in their respective positions arguing for their 
own self- interest. At the end, no decision was reached.
Table 3 represents the super- ordinate frames employed by 
groups to reach consensus. All groups began by working through 
the problem as a question of fairness. Four groups resolved the 
fairness question. Of these, three went on to employ common good 
as an organizing frame. Group One, though they resolved the 
fairness question, could not then identify another analytic frame 
that resonated across the group. And Group Four never was able to 
resolve the fairness question. Thus, in the end, only the three 
groups that resolved fairness and shifted to common good as a 
second super- ordinate frame were able to reach consensus.
Table 3. Super- Ordinate Analytic Frames Employed by Group





One Fairness None No
Two Fairness Common good Yes
Three Fairness Common good Yes
Four Fairness Can’t resolve fairness No
Five Fairness Common good Yes
What Children Learn
Did individual children’s understanding of the problem shift as a 
result of their participation in the deliberative dialogue? If so, how? 
As represented in table 4, 11 out of 20 children demonstrated 
understanding of at least one additional frame during their 
post- task interview than they had before the dialogue. 
Interestingly, these gains were not evenly distributed across 
groups. Whereas all children in Group Three grew in their ability 
to offer multiple ways of framing the problem, for example, only 
one child in Group Five made gains. In each of the other three 
groups, gains were moderate. A closer look at the narratives 
generated for each group offers some possible explanation for these 
differences.
Groups One and Four took the longest to complete their 
dialogue. Because neither group could reach consensus in the end, 
the researchers had to stop their conversations at the 25- minute 
mark. In both of these groups, gains in children’s framing from 
pre- to post- task interview were moderate, though for seemingly 
different reasons. Group One, remember, was unable to come up 
with a second super- ordinate frame after they resolved the fairness 
issue. When they could not, the children settled into their respec-
tive positions, arguing for their personal preferences. It seems that 
for this group, while children were exposed to a variety of frames, 
none but fairness was compelling enough to hold their attention.
Group Four was also unable to reach consensus because they 
could not resolve the issue of fairness. One group member insisted 
that his idea (sunshade) was best despite his peers’ concern that 
pre- K children deserved the money. Here, it seems, children were 
not exposed to many frames, and so their growth from pre- to 
post- were limited. Interestingly, in this group, only Curtis and 
Rachel showed gains. David and Maggie, the two who were most 
set in their positions from start to finish (David arguing for 
sunshade throughout and Maggie arguing for pre- K throughout), 
did not. Here, children’s openness to hear others’ ideas, it seems, 
played a powerful role in whether they showed gains from pre- to 
post- task interview.
Group Two also showed moderate gains. Though this group 
considered a variety of frames and did ultimately reach consensus, 
their conversation was relatively short (15 minutes), and so it  
seems they had fewer opportunities to engage alternative frames 
than their peers.
The group with the greatest amount of growth, Group 
Three was the group that spent the longest amount of time 
deliberating and who ultimately reached consensus. Not only 
did children discuss the problem at length, considering a 
number of analytic frames, but they also seemed willing to 
listen to one another in a collective effort to make a decision 
with which everyone would be happy. This is despite the fact 
that members of the group brought with them the fewest 
number of frames as they approached dialogue (four initial 
frames, as with Group Five). Thus it seems that time and a 
willingness to engage others’ ideas were facilitative conditions 
for children’s learning.
The group with the least gains, Group Five, held the shortest 
deliberation and reached consensus faster than any other group 
(13 minutes). This brief conversation seemingly denied students 
opportunities to thoughtfully consider a wide variety of analytic 
frames.
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Table 4. Frames Discussed by Children (Pre- /Post- )
Student Pre- Post- New Frames
Group One
Addie 2 2 0
Adam 4 4 0
Cody 4 5 1
Oliver 3 4 1
5 initial frames: fairness, self- interest, common good, kindness, tradition
Group Two
Dominic 2 4 2
Helen 3 3 0
Joshua 4 4 0
Taylor 2 3 1
6 initial frames: fairness, self- interest, common good, kindness, tradition, 
safety
Group Three
Brittany 2 4 2
Caleb 3 4 1
Jacob 1 2 1
Maddy 2 3 1
4 initial frames: fairness, self- interest, common good, tradition
Group Four
Maggie 2 2 0
Curtis 2 4 2
David 3 3 0
Rachel 2 3 1
5 initial frames: fairness, self- interest, common good, kindness, tradition
Group Five
Anna 3 4 1
Daniel 3 3 0
Eddie 1 1 0
Paula 2 2 0
4 initial frames: fairness, self- interest, common good, safety
Perhaps not surprisingly, self- interest was the frame most 
frequently mentioned by students during their pre- task interviews 
(see table 5). Recall that Zhang and colleagues (2013) found that 
American children were more likely to express egocentric con-
cerns such as personal consequences for doing the “right” thing. 
Despite self- interest being a common initial frame, however, it was 
not offered by many children in the context of dialogue, only being 
asserted eight times overall. That self- interest was a familiar frame 
(at least as familiar as fairness and common good), and yet not 
offered in dialogue suggests that children shared an understanding 
that it would not resonate with their peers. Whether conscious or 
not, I cannot say. But children seemed to know not to advance a 
self- interest position here. Was this because selfishness was 
understood as a poor character trait? Addie’s pre- task interview 
suggested this interpretation. She said, “I was trying to make a 
decision about the preK equipment and the swing set . . . because I 
really do want the preK to have equipment, but I don’t want to be 
selfish; that is why I put this as my choice.” It could also be that 
children’s previous experience taught them that asserting their own 
preference would be insufficient to persuade others.
Fairness and common good were the second most frequently 
discussed initial frames. This may explain why these two frames 
were offered most often and seemed to resonate with children 
more than the others. Unlike self- interest, these two frames were 
frequently employed in discussion. It seems that children believed 
these frames were worth putting on the table, perhaps because 
teachers and others in the school context often discussed problems 
and solutions using these frames.
Table 5. Children’s Initial Frames







A closer look at children’s initial frames offers no compelling 
finding about demographic patterns. Self- interest, common good, 
fairness, and safety were frames brought by children of both 
genders, all races, and both socio- economic identifiers. Tradition, 
perhaps interestingly, was only raised as a frame by White children 
(three boys and one girl). Kindness was raised only by two White 
boys. Of course, given the small sample of children participating in 
this exploratory study, I feel unable to make much of these specific 
results, except to say that tradition and kindness were perhaps 
frames less frequently encountered in the school setting.
Discussion
This exploratory study suggests that children do indeed think 
deeply about problems, considering different concerns that they 
believe should be taken into account, framing problems in a variety 
of ways. They seem to also have a keen sense of which frames will 
be the most persuasive in group dialogue. Though research 
suggests that children often think about problems as a matter of 
self- interest, data here suggest that they may refrain from asserting 
their personal preferences when deliberating with their peers. 
Instead, calling on fairness and common good as ways of reasoning 
about the problem that are more likely to resonate across the group. 
Children, it seems, are knowledgeable of cultural norms at play in 
the school context. Whether children would call upon the same 
analytic frames in different contexts is beyond the scope of this 
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study. Finally, analysis of data here suggests that certain conditions 
of peer dialogue may lead to greater gains in children’s ability to 
invoke and move between multiple analytic frames. Children who 
demonstrated a willingness and desire to engage others’ ideas were 
more likely to show gains.3 Relatedly, children who spent time 
working through the problem with their peers showed greater 
gains. It seems safe to say that the greater number of initial frames 
held by children in a group has the potential to facilitate greater 
gains for participants, but, as I have shown, this condition is not 
sufficient on its own. If children are unwilling to listen to one 
another, get stuck on one frame, or move too quickly to consensus 
without unpacking everyone’s ideas, children are less likely to 
benefit from their peers’ rich thinking.
Existing research on the nature of children’s participation in 
shared reasoning looks primarily at the type of rhetorical moves 
and argumentative strategies children employ (Clarke, Resnick, 
Rose, 2015). Evidence suggests that children’s engagement in 
transactive discourse (particularly when other- oriented), for 
instance, contributes to greater conceptual change and reasoning 
ability (Chi, 2009; Teasley, 1997). We have also come to understand 
that children appropriate various strategems, (such as prompting a 
peer, citing evidence, and restating one’s position) over the course 
of a given dialogue session (Anderson et al., 2001). To my knowl-
edge, however, this is the first study of its kind to examine the 
analytic frames children employ to make sense of problems, how 
they make sense of competing frames in the context of deliberative 
dialogue, and what they learn as a result. More research is certainly 
needed to expound upon these preliminary findings. In what 
follows, I offer some possible implications for teachers and 
researchers based on this initial foray into children’s negotiation of 
analytic frames.
Peer dialogue does indeed have the potential to be a power-
ful pedagogical space. Teachers committed to engaging dialogic 
practice, however, may want to consider how to foster children’s 
willingness to engage others’ ideas and how to provide ample 
time for doing so in the context of the school day. Educators often 
ask children to state their opinions and then to justify their 
arguments. Rarely do we push them then to think through why 
some arguments may strike us as better than others. And yet this 
additional layer of engagement with one another’s thinking is 
important. Not only can unpacking analytic frames (identifying 
new frames, asking why some frames resonate and others do not 
in particular contexts) perhaps make children more skilled 
deliberators, it may also help them become more critical consum-
ers of other people’s frames. Rojecki (2007), for example, reveals 
frames used in media commentary to privilege the goals of a 
movement opposed to teaching scientific evolution. Similarly, 
Martin (2015) described how megachurch pastors promoted 
fiscal conservatism following the 2008 financial crash, deploying 
“language and arguments that emphasize American economic 
providence and the need for individuals to take personal respon-
sibility” (p. 39). In the media, in church, in a multitude of venues 
in which citizens spend time, speakers and writers intentionally 
frame arguments to persuade. They do so by calling on values and 
norms we hold, maybe even subconsciously. A lack of awareness 
of this intentional framing leaves individuals vulnerable to 
persuasion and manipulation.
Relatedly, it seems children would benefit from an examina-
tion of the consequences of employing one frame over another. 
Group One, which was unable to find a second super- ordinate 
frame that resonated with everyone, ultimately resorted to 
debating their own personal preferences. Drawing this scenario 
out, one can imagine a community where citizens fail to identify 
a single concern or goal that unites them. Without common 
ground of this sort, their arguments fall upon deaf ears and they 
are unable to reach consensus about a shared problem. Unfortu-
nately, the consequence of this inability (or unwillingness) to find 
common ground results in frustration with one another, a lack of 
collective action, and— as is often the case— decisions made by 
technical procedures that leave portions of the community 
feeling unheard.
A number of intervention studies have shown that intentional 
instruction about argumentation strategies lead to children’s 
enhanced argumentation ability. But these focus mostly on 
rhetorical strategies rather than on the difficult work at the 
intersection of cognitive and moral reasoning— the negotiation of 
value systems is tricky. This work does suggest, however, that 
focused and intentional instruction about effective dialogue is 
worthwhile. That is, once we have a clearer sense of what such 
interventions should involve. Continued research into children’s 
thinking and doing is necessary for making informed practical 
recommendations. Much remains to be understood, for instance, 
about the frames children use, how they come to know them, how 
they understand their relative power in dialogue, and what they 
learn from deliberation of them. The small- scale study described 
here, I believe, raises interesting and important directions for this 
work. We could better understand how context matters for 
children’s analytic framing, if indeed it does. We could also better 
understand how aware children are of the frames they use and why, 
and what would come from more explicit talk about them. Finally, 
larger, more diverse samples may help us to identify patterns 
among children in the frames they employ.
Notes
1 My use of the work market here is in the simple sense of exchange, à la 
Bourdieu (1991), and not in the traditional capitalistic economic sense, 
as in Friedman et al.’s “free market” ideology.
2 This research program was generously supported by a grant from the 
Spencer Foundation’s New Civics Initiative.
3 In previous work, we highlight the critical role that trust plays in 
children’s willingness to engage collaboratively (James, Kobe, & Zhao, 
2017).
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Appendix A: Pre- Task Interview Protocol
 1. What is the problem?
 2. Which choice do you think is best? Why do you think that?
 3. How strongly do you feel about your choice? Why?
 4. How do you think others will feel about this problem? 
What do you think others will choose? How do you 
thinks others will respond to your idea?
 5. How do you think the conversation will go? What makes 
you think it will go this way?
 6. As a group your goal is to come to an agreement. By the 
end of your conversation do you think your group will 
come to agreement? Why/why not?
 7. As you go into this conversation, what are you going to 
try to do?
 8. What will you do if others disagree?
 9. How are you feeling about having this conversation?
 10. What do you hope will happen?
Appendix B: Post- Task Interview Protocol
 1. How did you feel about the conversation you just had? 
Why do you feel that way?
 2. How did the conversation go? Did it go as you expected? 
Explain.
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 3. Did anything surprise you? What?
 4. How did each member of your group think about the 
problem?
 5. Do you think the other people in your group wanted to 
know what you thought? How do you know?
 6. Do you think the other people in your thought your ideas 
were important? What makes you think that?
 7. Do you think others considered your ideas? How do you 
know?
 8. Did you want to know what the other people in your 
group thought? Why?
 9. Did you think the ideas your group members shared were 
important? Why? How did you show them their ideas 
were important? Which ones were most important to 
you?
 10. Did you consider the ideas your group members shared? 
Why? How did you show them you were considering 
their ideas?
 11. Did you learn anything about the topic? Did  
you learn anything about having discussions?  
Did you learn anything about any of your group 
members?
